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THE CONTINUING LEGAL BATTLE TO DEFINE AIR
SERVICE AT LOVE FIELD-FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IS IN
BETTER POSITION THAN COURTS TO INTERPRET
PROVISIONS OF WRIGHT AND SHELBY AMENDMENTS.
AMERIcAN AmLiNES V. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
202 F.3) 788 (5TH CIR. 2000).
KEN THOMAS
T HE DEBATE OVER the extent of allowable air service oper-
ating out of the Love Field airport in Dallas, Texas, has been
ongoing since development of the Dallas-Fort Worth Interna-
tional Airport (DFW) began in 1964.' As a consequence of law-
suits relating to the passage of the Wright and Shelby
Amendments2 (Amendments), both of which attempted to de-
fine the scope of air service at Love Field, various interested par-
ties petitioned the United States Department of Transportation
(DOT) to rule on several issues pertaining to the interpretation
of the Amendments.3 Several of the parties challenged the
DOT's interpretations. Those challenges led to the consoli-
dated appeal in American Airlines v. Department of Transportation.4
In this case, the Fifth Circuit was presented with issues ranging
from the allegation that the DOT's interpretive proceedings vio-
lated numerous procedural rules to the examination of the "rea-
sonableness" of the DOT's final interpretations of the
In 1964, the Civil Aeronautics Board paved the way for the development of
DFW Airport by requiring the Texas cities of Dallas and Fort Worth to cooperate
in building and operating a new regional airport. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't
of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom, City of Fort
Worth v. Dep't of Transp., 120 S. Ct. 2740 (2000).
2 See Int'l Air Transp. Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, § 29, 94
Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980) [hereinafter Wright Amendment]; Dep't of Transp. & Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337, 111 Stat.
1425, 1447 (1997) [hereinafter Shelby Amendment].
3 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 795.
Id. at 793.
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Amendments. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the DOT has
more expertise than the courts in the interpretation of federal
aviation-related issues and upheld the DOT's "reasonable" inter-
pretations.5 The court correctly analyzed all elements of the
grounds for appeal and appropriately concluded that the DOT's
interpretations were reasonable and within the power that Con-
gress had allocated to the DOT in its effort to regulate federal
air traffic.
Prior to 1964, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, located
within 40 miles of each other, operated separate and indepen-
dent airports. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the prede-
cessor of the DOT, determined that the operation of separate
airports created competition in air service that was detrimental
to the region.6 Consequently, in 1964, the CAB ordered Dallas
and Fort Worth to build an airport that would be cooperatively
operated by both cities. In response, Dallas and Fort Worth cre-
ated the DFW Board.7 The Board adopted the 1968 Regional
Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance (Ordinance) that pro-
vided for the phase-out of certain air services from Love Field
(along with air services at other Dallas-Fort Worth regional air-
ports) and the transfer of those air services to the new DFW fa-
cility.8 Southwest Airlines, which was exempt from CAB control
because it operated only intrastate flights out of Love Field, re-
fused to transfer its operations to the DFW facility.' An ongoing
legal battle began in an attempt to define the allowable scope of
Love Field air service. "()
After the passage of the Shelby Amendment in 1997, numer-
ous airlines operating or planning to operate out of Love Field
began offering service to take advantage of the amendment's
additional service exemptions (beyond those in the Wright
Amendment)." Southwest Airlines, an established operator of
intrastate flights from Love Field (as well as flights to the ex-
5 Id. at 813.
" Id. at 793.
7 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 793. The CAB intended for DFW to be the primary
source of air service in the north Texas region.
Id.
SId.
10 Id. The first lawsuit was filed in an effort to force Southwest Airlines from
Love Field. The court ruled that the airline had a "federally declared right" to
continue using the airport as long as it remained open. SeeTexas Int'l Airlines v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 546 F.2d 84, 103 (5th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 832
(1977).
1 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 794-95.
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empted states allowed by the Wright Amendment), began oper-
ating flights to Mississippi and Alabama.' 2 Legend Airlines, a
start-up service, announced plans to provide long-haul service to
states outside the exempted service area by reconfiguring high-
capacity jet aircraft to hold less than 57 passengers. 3 Continen-
tal Express announced its intention to provide regional jet ser-
vice (with less than 57 passenger seats) direct to Cleveland.' 4
As a result of the Shelby Amendment's passage, Fort Worth
sued the city of Dallas, the DFW Board, Legend Airlines, Conti-
nental Airlines, and Continental Express in state court in an at-
tempt to prevent expanded air service at Love Field.' 5 The state
lawsuit centered around the language of Section 9.5 of the Ordi-
nance, which required Dallas and Fort Worth to "take such steps
as may be necessary, appropriate, and legally permissible... to
provide for the orderly, efficient, and effective phase-out at Love
Field.. .of any and all [air carriers] and to transfer such activities
to [DFW]."'" The state court ruled that federal laws regulating
air traffic did not preempt the air service "phase-out" require-
ments of the Ordinance and that Dallas was contractually bound
to prohibit interstate flights out of Love Field.' v While the state
suit was pending, the city of Dallas sued the city of Fort Worth
and the DOT in federal court to obtain a declaratory judgment
finding that Dallas was not required to prohibit eligible air carri-
ers from operating out of Love Field within the service provi-
sions of the Amendments.'
While the state and federal cases were pending, several of the
parties petitioned the DOT to initiate administrative proceed-
ings for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the
Amendments at issue in those suits.' The DOT informed the
parties that it intended to rule on four issues of federal law and
12 Id. The Shelby Amendment added the states of Mississippi, Alabama, and
Kansas to the list of states already exempt from the Wright Amendment's restric-
tions on direct flights from Love Field (Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New
Mexico). See Wright Amendment, supra note 2, at § 29(c); see also Shelby Amend-
ment, supra note 2, at § 337(b).
"I Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 795.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 793; see also City of Fort Worth Internet Briefing on Commercial Air Passenger
Service in the Dallas/Fort Worth Area, (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) <http://www.
dfwnet.com/cmo/Wright/bondord.htm>.
17 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 795.
18 Id.
19 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 795.
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gave the parties an opportunity to submit comments.2 2 The
DFW Board submitted a request asking that the DOT also deter-
mine the effect of increased air service at Love Field on DFW
Airport.2' The DOT granted the Board's request and allowed
the parties an extension of time to file responses for this fifth
issue .22 On December 22, 1998, the DOT issued a Declaratory
Order resolving the five questions at issue. 23 The DOT interpre-
tations were not accepted by all parties and a petition for review
was submitted to the Fifth Circuit in the present case. The Fifth
Circuit determined that the DOT interpretations were reasona-
ble and that the court would defer to the expertise of the DOT
in federal aviation issues.24 The United States Supreme Court
denied the petitioners' writ of certiorari on June 29, 2000.25
The critical issues in this case can be divided into two distinct
categories: procedural issues and interpretive issues. Regarding
the procedural issues, some of the petitioners in the present
case argued that: (1) DOT's procedures violated the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA); (2) DOT's decision contravened a
prior Texas state court ruling on the same issues in dispute; and
(3) DOT did not comply with environmental regulations prior
to reaching its decision. 21 With respect to the interpretive is-
sues, the petitioners sought a detailed review of each of the in-
terpretations of federal law on which the DOT ruled. First, the
petitioners argued that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) did
not preempt the contractual obligations of Dallas and Fort
Worth under the Ordinance.27 Second, the petitioners argued
that the Amendments did not authorize long-haul service
(flights to states outside of the Amendments' exempted service
areas) from Love Field, contrary to the DOT's findings. 2' Third,
the petitioners argued that the contractual "use agreements"
2o Dep't of Transp. Order 98-8-29 (Docket OST-98-4363) at 10, 13 (Aug. 25,
1998).
21 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 795.
22 1(l. See also Dep't of Transp. Order 98-9-5 (Docket OST-98-4363) at 2-4
(Sept. 3, 1998).
23 Dep't of Transp. Order 98-12-28 (Docket OST-98-4363) (Dec. 22, 1998).
24 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 813.
25 City of Fort Warth, 120 S. Ct. at 2740.
" ' Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 796; see alsoAdmin. Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et.
Seq. (2000) [hereinafter Administrative Procedure Act (APA)].
27 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 804; see also Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)].
28 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 808.
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signed by numerous air carriers as a result of the Ordinance
were not preempted by federal law.2" Finally, numerous parties
to the present action argued that permitting an air carrier to
provide "through service" between Love Field and any other air-
port outside the permitted exclusion zones violated the Wright
Amendment." In its analysis of each interpretive issue, the
court looked closely at the level of review it would exercise over
the DOT's findings."
Judge Garza, writing for the Fifth Circuit, began the court's
decision by examining the procedural issues raised by the peti-
tioners. The court determined that the DOT's proceedings did
not violate the APA because the DOT complied with minimum
procedural notice requirements and because the DOT's con-
tacts with Continental Express and Legend Airlines were permis-
sible under the DOT regulations in as much as they did not
affect the outcome of the DOT's proceedings. 2 Furthermore,
the court ruled that common law preclusion doctrines were not
applicable to the present case and, as such, the DOT was not
required to give preclusive effect to previous state court rulings
on the issues at hand.33 The court noted that the regulation of
aviation is a federal issue and Congress created the DOT with
preeminent authority over such matters. 4 In discussing the fi-
nal procedural issue, the court examined the contention that
the DOT violated regulatory procedures by failing to file an En-
vironmental Impact Study (EIS) prior to issuing its interpreta-
tions of federal law.35 Under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), a governmental agency must perform an EIS when
the acts of that agency constitute "major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment;" but, as
the court noted, the DOT was merely interpreting federal law
created by Congress."' Therefore, the court determined that
29 Id. at 810.
0) Id. at 812.
31 Id. at 796.
3'1 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 797-98. DOT regulations prohibit certain ex parte
contacts between the agency and parties to an administrative proceeding. See 14
C.F.R. § 300.2(a) (2000).
33 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 801.
34 Id.
35 The Love Field Citizens Action Committee, a petitioner in the present case,
argued that the DOT was required to perform an EIS since its interpretations of
the Shelby Amendment, which would inevitably increase air traffic at Love Field,
constituted a "major federal action" within the meaning in the NEPA. Id. at 803.
316 Id. See also Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
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congressional lawmaking, not the DOT's interpretations of
those laws, triggered the requirement of an EIS.37
The court then reviewed the DOT's interpretations of the
provisions of the Amendments and certain provisions of the
ADA. The court ruled that the DOT has the authority and ex-
pertise to interpret the provisions of the ADA; therefore, the
court deferred to the DOT's determination that the power to
restrict air service out of Love Field was outside Dallas' rights as
"proprietor" of the airport." The court then noted that a plain
reading of the Amendments permits the operation of long-haul
air service out of Love Field within the prescribed aircraft size
limitations (a "commuter airline")."' The court reviewed the
DOT's interpretation of a "commuter airline" using the Chevron
analysis-a two-step test developed by the United States Su-
preme Court to review a governmental agency's interpretation
of a statute that it is charged with administering."' The court
determined that the DOT's interpretation of a "commuter air-
line" (to include both turboprop and jet aircraft with less than
57 passenger seats) was reasonable; therefore, the court de-
ferred to the DOT's interpretation. 4' Additionally, the court
used the Chevron analysis to conclude that the DOT was reasona-
ble in its conclusion that the commuter airline exemption ap-
plied to all air service restrictions proscribed by the Wright
Amendment.4"2 In this instance, the DOT determined that any
air carrier that met the size and passenger limits of a "com-
muter" airline (as specified in the Wright Amendment) may
'7 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 803.
Id. at 804-8. The court was primarily concerned with the provision of the
ADA that says a State may not "enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion" that affects the "route" or "service" of an air carrier. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)((1) (1994). However, the exception to this provision gives a State the
authority to exercise its "proprietary powers" as ovner or operator of an airport.
See id. § 41713(b) (3).
3 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 809.
41 Id. at 808. In the Chevron analysis, the court must first determine whether
Congress has defined a clear intent as to the meaning of a provision of the law. If
congressional intent is clear, the court will give effect to the clear intent. If con-
gressional intent is not clearly expressed, the court must determine if the
agency's interpretation of the issue at hand is reasonable. If the court finds the
agency's interpretation to be reasonable, the court will uphold that interpreta-
tion. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
' Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 810.
42 Id. at 812-13. The petitioners argued that the restrictions on through service
in the Wright Amendment applied to commuter aircraft as well as larger aircraft.
See id.
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provide "through service" from Love Field to any airport outside
the States exempted in the Amendments so long as that airline
uses a city within Texas as a connecting airport.4" No dissenting
opinions were presented in this case, as Judges Duhe and Barks-
dale joined Judge Garza in the opinion.4 4
The Fifth Circuit correctly analyzed the procedural issues
presented in this case. The court noted that the DOT precisely
specified the issues it would rule on, allowed the interested par-
ties the opportunity to comment on those issues, and then ruled
on those precise issues, as well as a factual issue that should have
been obvious to all parties.4" Therefore, the court was correct in
holding that the DOT provided adequate notice to the parties of
the issues to be discussed." In analyzing the propriety of the
contact that various parties had with the DOT, the court looked
to the timing and nature of those contacts to determine if they
had any effect on the interpretive rulings. The court determined
that some contacts occurred prior to DOT proceedings, so they
did not violate DOT regulations on ex parte contact.4 7 Addition-
ally, the court noted the contacts that took place during the in-
terpretive proceedings did not involve the merits of the
proceedings, but rather were requests by the parties for the
DOT to intervene on their behalf in the pending lawsuits."
From this review, the court correctly determined that the con-
tacts were not improper since they had no persuasive effect on
the DOT's findings.4"
Additionally, the court correctly ruled that the DOT did not
have to give preclusive effect to prior state court rulings on the
issues in question. This decision was based on the court's view
that the resolution of the federal statutory questions in the pre-
sent case is better left to the expertise and authority of the
DOT." ' As a final procedural inquiry, the court appropriately
13 Id.
44 Id. at 792, 813.
45 Id. at 797. Petitioner Fort Worth argued that it was not given adequate no-
tice that the DOT would investigate the effect of increased air service at Love
Field. The court found that no notice of this additional factual issue was re-
quired because the parties could reasonably expect this issue to be discussed
based on the nature of the interpretive issues that the DOT would be reviewing.
Id.
46 Id.
47 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 798.
48 Id.
49 Id.
5 Id. at 798-801.
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determined that the DOT was not required to prepare an EIS
since the interpretative findings issued by the DOT were not the
root cause of the increased flight traffic at Love Field.5"
In its review of the DOT's interpretive findings, the Fifth Cir-
cuit correctly applied the Chevron analysis to determine whether
the court should defer to the DOT's findings. For each of the
disputed issues, the court correctly found that the DOT's inter-
pretations of the Amendments and the ADA were "reasonable"
(thereby satisfying step two of the Chevron analysis); conse-
quently, the court deferred to the DOT's interpretations. 2 The
Fifth Circuit conducted an extremely detailed inquiry using
thorough and logical reasoning in resolving all points of conten-
tion in the present petition.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit specifically noted that it did not
feel that the DOT's interpretations were the only possible inter-
pretations of the Amendments; but, the court noted that it did
not have the proper expertise in aviation-related issues to over-
rule the DOT when the agency's findings were reasonable.5"
Additionally, the court showed concern over how its ruling
would affect the intended operation of the DFW Airport. The
court's main worry appears to be that small, commuter airlines
operating out of Love Field might begin cooperative service with
larger airlines operating from other Texas airports (such as
Houston or San Antonio) to provide long-haul service originat-
ing at Love Field, which could be detrimental to the volume of
air service at DFW 4 It is important to note that, as of Septem-
ber 2000, some air carriers operating out of Love Field have not
taken advantage of the additional service area exemptions pro-
vided by the Shelby Amendment.5 5 Consequently, the concerns
of the court have not been fully realized since DFW remains the
sole provider (in the north Texas region) for certain air service
routes that are permitted to originate at Love Field.
51 Id. at 803.
52 1I. at 804-13.
53 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 813.
54 /d.
5 For example, as of September 23, 2000, Southwest Airlines did not operate
flights between Love Field and any airport in Kansas-a location exempted from
the service limitations of the Wright Amendment as supplemented by the Shelby
Amendment. Southwest Airlines does operate flights to Kansas City International
Airport, which is located in Missouri. See Southwest Airlines Schedule
Homepage, at <http://www.southwest.com/cgi-bin/requestSchedule.htm> (last
visited Sept. 23, 2000).
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This case represents another dispute in the long and bitter
struggle to define the limits of air service permitted at Love
Field. The debate involves a myriad of legal questions and fore-
most among them are the interpretations of the Wright and
Shelby Amendments. As this case points out, the courts are will-
ing to defer to the expertise of the DOT in the interpretation of
federal aviation law, provided that those interpretations are rea-
sonable. Further litigation will surely follow, but the Fifth Cir-
cuit has provided a clear signal to future litigants that the court
will defer to the DOT's reasonable interpretations of the provi-
sions of the Amendments.
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